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TWO IDEAS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONt 
John H. Barton* 
Political theory has long sought a philosophical basis for such ideas as 
law, authority, and freedom - but usually within the context of the nation-
state. Only rarely has political theory placed the nation-state in an interna-
tional framework; and, when it has tried, it has often done poorly. Some-
times the political theory becomes purely altruistic and utopian; at other 
times it works to support the irresponsibility of individual governments and 
the breakup of international order. 
Yet, in the real world, the nation-state and the international system 
emerged together, as central governments increased their domestic power to 
be better able to wage war and to defend themselves from one another. 1 
Those who sought ideas to tame this international anarchy developed two 
fundamentally opposed theories. One, following Immanuel Kant, is con-
tractual. It begins with the nation-state as an essentially complete and justi-
fied society and sees that nation-state as creating a carefully limited and 
controlled international system. The other, following Jean Jacques Rous-
seau, is organic. It begins with the entirety of human society and sees that 
society as bringing forth governmental institutions at several levels, some 
national and some international. Sometimes these two theories describe 
complementary methods of integration. Sometimes, however, their de-
mands are contradictory because of their completely different attitudes to-
ward national governments. 
I. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand 
that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guarantee-
ing the rights of each. This would be a federation of nations, but it must 
not be a nation consisting of nations. The latter would be contradictory, 
for in every nation there exists the relation of ruler (legislator) to subject 
(those who obey, the people); however, many nations in a single nation 
would constitute only a single nation, which contradicts our assumption 
2 
t It was Eric Stein's texts and writing on international law and on the European Economic 
Communities that first opened my mind to the possibilities of integration beyond the United 
Nations level. I am pleased to dedicate this piece to him. I wish also to thank Thomas Grey 
and Michael Shuman who have read and commented upon drafts of this paper. 
• Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.S. 1958, Marquette University; J.D. 1968, 
Stanford University. - Ed. 
l. See Finer, State- and Nation-Building in Europe: Tire Role of tire Military, in THE FOR• 
MATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 84 (C. Tilly ed. 1975). 
2. I. KANT, To Perpetual Peace; A Pltilosopltical Sketch, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER 
ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 115 (T. Humphrey trans. 1983) (emphasis in 
original). 
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WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS ... HAVE RE-
SOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS .... Accordingly, our re-
spective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of 
San Francisco ... have agreed to the present Charter of the United Na-
tions and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as 
the United Nations.3 
There are many reasons why a philosopher of international political re-
lations might begin with the nation-state: a sense of the indivisibility of 
national sovereignty,4 a sense of the State as the positive law giver,5 or a 
contemporary Realpolitik - and positivist - realization that the State is 
the actual locus of effective power and of citizens' psychological identifica-
tion.6 Once the State is given such primacy, international organizations, if 
possible at all, are possible only as secondary and derivative entities, cre-
ated and legitimated by national governments. When nation-states are po-
litically able to create such organizations their motivations can be only their 
own mutual enlightened self-interest. The strength of the organizations will 
be limited by the depth of the shared self-interest. 
The United States Constitution of 1789 is the first and preeminent ex-
ample of contractual integration. Separate states, each formally sovereign, 
negotiated an agreement, ratified by all, that transferred a large portion of 
their sovereignty to a central authority. The central authority later became 
much more powerful and ultimately replaced the states as the focus of citi-
zens' allegiance. Moreover, the contractual union was possible only be-
cause of a profound sense of community based on a shared history and 
shared conflict. And for many, the union was not simply contractual, but 
was intended immediately to create a single fully sovereign nation.7 
But in constitutional theory, the federation was in many respects simply 
a very powerful organization created by the otherwise independent states. 
In theory, the federal government held only delegated power, its legal order 
was separate from that of the states, and the possibility of a state's with-
drawal was never resolved legally until the issue became moot with the 
Civil War. And, on entering the agreement, each state carefully counted its 
practical gains and losses. Such calculus underlay the "great compromise" 
of basing Senate representation on sovereign equality and House member-
ship on population. 
The integration mechanism relied heavily on law. The symbol of agree-
ment was a written constitution that cried out for judicial interpretation and 
application. The most critical issues before the first generation of the Court 
were issues of system design - of the allocation of power among the vari-
ous federal institutions and between the federal and the state institutions. 
Although we may now think of judicial review as primarily a way to protect 
individual rights, it originated as a way to police federalism. Adherence to 
3. U.N. CHARTER preamble. 
4. See J. BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE (R. Knolles trans. 1606) (espe-
cially Book 1, ch. 8). 
5. See H. KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1948). 
6. See H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 491-503 (5th ed. rev. 1978). 
7. For examples of the debate, see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC, 1776-1787, at 469-564 (1969). 
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strict legal limits was the best protection against tyranny of the interna-
tional organization over the individual state. 
The designs of both the League of Nations and the United Nations lie 
fully in this tradition of contracts among independent nations. Woodrow 
Wilson's fourteenth point, for example, called for "[Al general association 
of nations [to] ... be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integ-
rity to great and small states alike."8 The new League was to be created by 
a covenant (just like the 1789 Constitution) among independent - and 
legally equal - states. It was to build in large part on traditional interna-
tional mechanisms of bringing peace to states, such as balance of power 
diplomacy and dispute settlement. By meeting and consulting, the nations 
of the League would be more easily able to coordinate their force levels and 
alliance structures to maintain peace. Dispute settlement would be achieved 
through a panoply of international courts, mediation structures, and cool-
ing-off periods, all working state-to-state. This institution failed to develop 
the judicial review that marked the early history of the United States. In-
stead, the diplomats of the era sought international agreements, such as that 
prohibit all war, even in those situations in which the Covenant had still 
permitted it.9 
The United Nations is even more strongly within the contractual tradi-
tion. A British critic compared the two in 1946: "instead of limiting the 
sovereignty of States we have actually extended the sovereignty of the 
Great Powers, the only States whose sovereignty is still a formidable reality 
in the modern world." 10 This was perhaps a result of the immediate con-
text of the organization, which derived in large part from the wartime prop-
aganda of nation-states, and also amounted to a continuation of the 
wartime alliance against Germany and Japan. The United Nations had lit-
tle chance to develop a sense of community or an organic structure before 
becoming overwhelmed by tensions between East and West and later North 
and South. 
Its legal structure is equally contractual. The charter fully incarnates 
the contractual principles of sovereign equality and political independence 
of nations .11 In the General Assembly each nation has one vote, regardless 
of its population or its actual interest or responsibility in a specific issue, 
and such representation has become an automatic principle for any United 
Nations-related activity. 12 This is clearly an instrument of nations and only 
8. Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two 
Houses of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918), reprinted in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1918, Surr. I, VOL. I at 12, 16 (1933). 
9. See The Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 
94 L.N.T.S. 57. For the diplomacy of this period, see E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 
1919-1939 (2d ed. 1946); A. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 
1918-1935 (1936). 
10. J. BRIERLY, THE COVENANT AND THE CHARTER 23 (1947). 
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. 
12. According to one commentator: 
In fact, thanks to the 'majority rule' from which they profit, the developing countries 
have opened a substantial breach in the legal edifice constructed in the past by the indus-
trialized States in order to provide a firm base for their domination, and they are taking 
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indirectly of the people within nations. 
IL THE ORGANIC MODEL 
The Federation must embrace all the important Powers in its member-
ship; it must have a Legislative Body, with powers to pass laws and ordi-
nances binding upon all its members; it must have a coercive force capable 
of compelling every State to obey its common resolves .... 13 
[T)he [European) Coal and Steel Community took the political, admin-
istrative, and economic leaders out of their national context and gave them 
for the first time a responsibility for the problems they shared with their 
neighbours. Once they had experienced this widening of scope there was 
no going back on it. 14 
In the organic model, authority derives from a source outside the na-
tion-state: God, part of society, or, most commonly in today's thought, 
man. Both national and international institutions can derive their authority 
directly from such a source and can thus have independent legitimacy. De-
sign of international organization then looks less to contract and more to 
the sources and interactions of authority at each of these levels. The under-
lying theoretical issue is no longer ensuring that the international organiza-
tion not assume powers beyond those granted to it by national 
governments; rather, the focus is on drawing lines between two legitimate 
authorities. 
The organic model will vary radically depending on the character of the 
community and the source of authority. In one version, that source is di-
vine and beyond politics, as exemplified in theories of the Papacy or the 
Caliphate. In a second version, the autonomy of both the national and the 
international political orders are denied. It is assumed, as in dependencia 
criticism, that both levels of power are used for parochial purposes, such as 
the accumulation of capital, and that the entire system is merely the exter-
nal manifestation of such underlying purposes. A third view is that of au-
thority deriving from democratic interaction among people at a variety of 
levels, an approach exemplified by the coordination of democratic political 
action in the United States after the Civil War and in Europe after World 
War II. This is a Rousseauian or Hegelian view of the evolution of human 
society in which the focus for each level is likely to rest upon a sense of 
community and identification. Like the national order, the international 
order must involve interaction among citizens in order to reflect and build 
community. 
full advantage of this opening to transform the established order, using the momentum of 
development. But this numerical importance of the Third World countries only represents 
a balancing factor, still fragile and uncertain, in the face of the real strength of the indus-
trialized countries and the means to apply pressure that they have at their disposal. 
Bedjaoui,A Third World view of international organizations. Action towards a new international 
economic order, in THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 206, 209-10 (G. Abi-
Saab ed. 1981). 
13. J. ROUSSEAU, A LASTING PEACE THROUGH THE FEDERATION OF EUROPE AND THE 
STATE OF WAR 59-60 (Vaughan trans. 1917), as cited by K. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND 
WAR 185 (1959). 
14. Monnet, Economic Integration: New Forms of Partnership, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE, 1910-1960, at 97, 101 (1960). 
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A. Religious Integration 
If our program [pan-Islam] were instituted in even a small area, the 
whole Muslim world would not fail, out of religious discipline, to accept 
the legitimacy of this new caliph . . . . Indeed, every government exercis-
ing control over Muslim subjects would find itself compelled to conciliate 
them to an extent commensurate with their unity and public opinion in 
permitting them to follow the religious guidance of their caliph, as the 
Catholics do with the Pope.15 
There are many examples of religious community as the conceptual ba-
sis for an international institution that relates directly to people within na-
tions, derives its legitimacy from its religious source, and may help restrain 
conflict between nations. The quotation above reflects the Islamic sense of 
theumma, the community of believers, which is to be supervised by a revi-
val of the caliphate, an early Islamic governing institution. Central alle-
giance is to the religious community, and, in this particular tradition, that 
community is much more real than is any civil community. In such a con-
text, the state is deemphasized, and may be held outside the law. Such 
deemphasis can easily provide psychological support for secular autocracy. 
The medieval Papacy sought, like Islam, to build a sense of community 
that transcended the boundaries of the more secular institutions, and the 
Papacy frequently claimed that it was the juridical source of the legitimacy 
of such secular institutions. 16 A more recent example is the Zionist move-
ment, the most successful of the great contemporary religious approaches to 
the rethinking of the nation-state. Israel is in most ways a modem nation-
state, but its political and legal ties with the Jewish community throughout 
the world reflect a sense that transcends traditional national borders.17 
The religious pattern is likely to gain importance, because second and 
third generation leaders of the newly independent nations of Africa and 
Asia may well seek to justify and shape their rule in terms of authentic 
national culture rather than in terms of Western ideas. The internal diffi-
culties of Western secular society in controlling crime and maintaining a 
family structure make it easy for such leaders to reject the Western legalistic 
tradition (and possibly even the Western democratic tradition). Moreover, 
within the West itself, particularly the Western hemisphere, there are signs 
of major religious revival. It is quite possible that some of this activity will 
lead to new institutions transcending the nation-state.1 8 
15. MUHAMMAD RASHID Rn;>A, AL-KHILAFA AU AL-IMA.MA 'L-'UZMA ("THE CALIPHATE, 
OR SUPREME IMAMATE") 103 (1923), quoted in M. KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM 184 (1966), 
16. There was also a position that the political and the secular authorities were essentially 
equal, each in its own sphere. See Hrabar, Esquisse d'une histoire lilleraire du /)roil lnterna• 
tional au moyen age du Ive au XIJie siecle, (pts. I & 2), 18 Rev. DR. INT. 7, 373 (1936) 
(reprinted by permission 1972). 
17. For a description of the historical sense, see Feinberg, The Recognition of the Jewish 
People in International Law, in Jew. Y.B. OF !NTL. L. 1948, at I (1949), and as a more recent 
example,Allorney-General of Israel v. Ado!f Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Sup. Ct. of Israel 1962). 
18. There is also a tradition that international order will follow immediately from personal 
conversions, either to a specific religious belief or to a religious-like recognition of the unity of 
mankind: 
In the world of Great Unity, the whole world becomes a great unity. There is no 
division into national states and no differences between races. There will be no war. 
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B. .Dependencia 
[W]e must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and 
State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of 
the techniques and tactics of domination. 19 
An alternate explanation of the parallel national and international or-
ders is that they both derive from a concealed source of power. In essence, 
the state is merely a means through which a particular social class operates 
and exercises its authority. If the class can do so through the state, it can do 
so as well through an international institution.20 
This type of position is relatively easy to support as a criticism of some 
actual international organizations, especially the various functional organi-
zations. There is little doubt, for example, that the constituency of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is in large part a combination of the 
relevant ministries and of those economic interests which gain through free 
trade. Moreover, a business leader seeking a particular tariff arrangement 
is likely to lobby with equal ease in national and international organ-
izations. 
But the argument can also be made with respect to such powerful orga-
nizations as the International Monetary Fund, an organization that is quite 
closely controlled by the developed nations and that does interfere quite 
deeply in the internal economic affairs of developing nations. Supporters of 
the Fund can reasonably respond that membership is voluntary and that 
the painful economic adjustment mechanisms it encourages are unavoid-
able and actually less painful than the alternative of unilateral adjustment. 
The critic might counter that the very need for economic adjustment is in 
part an artifact of the international economic order, an order designed and 
imposed by business interests in the developed world - and that it is not a 
historical accident that this institution is powerful and controlled by the 
North, while the Southern majority in the General Assembly is essentially 
ignored.21 
The dependencia insights can support action toward serious reform of 
international and national organization in an effort to obtain greater justice. 
They argue, however, that both levels of organization are essentially unreal, 
so that action is often psychologically paralyzed and gives way to a criticism 
that asks others to act. One turns to the repetitive resolutions of the Gen-
K'ANG Yu-WEI, TA-T'UNG SHU {BOOK OF GREAT UNITY) (written 1901-1902, published 1935), 
quoted in A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 732-33 (Wing-Tsit Chan trans. and comp. 
1963). This line of thought, however, does not generally lead to an international organization, 
and is therefore not emphasized in this paper. For a very thoughtful discussion of philosophies 
of preventing war (as opposed to philosophies of international organization), see K.N. WALTZ, 
supra note 13. 
19. M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
1972-1977, at 102 (1980), quoted in Benney, Gramsci on Law, Morality, and Power, 11 INTL. J. 
Soc. L. 191, 198 (1983). 
20. The argument need not be class-based, but can be more epistemological, as in David 
Kennedy's article, Theses about International Law Discourse, 23 G.Y.I.L. 353 (1980). And the 
current Soviet position on international organization is much more contractual, presumably 
reflecting Soviet concern about outside interference. See Morozov, The socialist conception ef 
international organization, in Abi-Saab, supra note 12, at 173. 
21. See Bedjaoui, supra note 12. 
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eral Assembly and the predictable consequent United States criticism of the 
United Nations. Neither the religious approach nor the dependencia ap-
proach accepts the existence of two levels of actual political community. 
C. Democratic International Organization 
The tasks allotted to the European Parliament in the constitutional 
structure of the European Communities and the part it is intended to play 
on the path to 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' require 
a body which is capable of acting.22 
President Lincoln recognized the depth of organic union underlying the 
United States contractual union when he assumed power to wage war 
against the states on behalf of the federation. He spoke the language of 
contract: "[l]fthe United States be not a government proper, but an associa-
tion of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a contract, be 
peaceably unmade, by less than all the parties who made it?"23 But the 
content was far beyond contract. The illegitimacy of secession was care-
fully not defined in the Constitution, and Lincoln's action undercut the sov-
ereignty of the several states. He leapt beyond legality and contract, a leap 
that risked tyranny and hubris and was justifiable, if at all, only through an 
agonized judgment that the federation was truly one community and that 
the whole community - both North and South - would ultimately benefit 
from unity. 
Certainly, there had long been a sense of United States community that, 
along with economic interests, had led the former colonies to seek unity and 
to try again after the failure of the Articles of Confederation. Moreover, it 
supported the Supreme Court's extension of federal power over state law in 
cases such as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee24 and McCulloch v. Maryland.25 
But what shows the difference between a contractual and an organic com-
munity is that Lincoln was motivated by an extra-constitutional sense that 
the Union had to be held together, a sense beyond constitutional or legal 
duty. 
The Civil War accelerated the historical trend of citizens transferring 
their allegiance from the states to the federal government. The fourteenth 
amendment legitimized and encouraged federal interference in state actions 
to achieve new nationally held goals of justice. Judicial review became a 
tool centered far more on enforcing human rights than on enforcing feder-
alism. Based on this deeper sense of community, later and less dramatic 
evolutions transferred a whole range of power from the state governments 
to the federal government. The Progressive movement took the power to 
choose federal senators from state legislatures and gave it to the people. 
The income tax was authorized and gave the federal government the power 
deriving from possession of the most equitable taxing system in the nation. 
22. Judgment of May 22, 1979, BVerfG, W. Ger., SI BVerfG 222, 246 (English version 
reprinted in 27 Co=on Mkt. L. Reps. 497, SIS (1980)). 
23. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address-Final Text, in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 265 (1953), quoted in J. FRANK, LINCOLN AS A LAWYER 
142 (1961). 
24. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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The states that had carefully weighed their voting rights in 1789 almost 
forgot to evaluate whether they received a net benefit or loss from federal 
taxation and expenditures. 
Some of these ideas, and some of these hopes, have been carried over 
into international organization, more so into the League of Nations than 
into the United Nations. Thus, in addition to the balance of power and 
dispute settlement ideas already discussed, there was, at the core of the 
League, an effort to bring people and public opinion into the peace-making 
process. Consider Woodrow Wilson's call for "[O]pen covenants of peace, 
openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international under-
standings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in 
the public view . . . ."26 The House of Lords emphasized the same point 
in its famous 1918 debate on the "hue and cry," which was later described 
as "the embodiment of a sense of solidarity."27 But there was more. It was 
this period that saw the creation of an international civil service and of the 
idea that there could be impartial international personnel - a concept logi-
cally dependent on the existence of a sense of community to attract the 
personnel's loyalty. The leading special purpose international institution 
created in the era was the International Labour Organization, the only offi-
cial international organization that has provided representation to sub-
national institutions (labor and management) as well as to governments. 
Such an organization cannot be controlled by governments, as the Eastern 
bloc discovered when the organization investigated Poland in the late 
1970's.28 At a more symbolic level, Wilson's emphasis on national self-
determination was a Rousseauian, organic concept, not a Kantian, contrac-
tual one. 
After World War II, the Uni!ed Nations took a more contractual ap-
proach than the League, but Europe pursued the organic approach. The 
new European system was legally phrased in contractual terms, but, as sug-
gested by Jean Monnet's statement above,29 the planners deliberately chose 
those contractual steps that would enhance the idea of community and 
make the progress toward integration irreversible. Formal unity would 
lead to human unity.3° 
The mechanisms that Europe chose were those of democracy. One of 
the most important approaches - built on the post-Civil War United States 
model - was to use human rights as a step toward integration. The first 
major European institution - negotiated before the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization or the European Economic Community - was the European 
Convention on Human Rights,31 a transnational legal structure to help 
26. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 8, at 15. 
27. A. ZIMMERN, supra note 9, at 174-78. 
28. Valticos, Une nouvelle forme d'action internationale: Les 'Contacts Directs' de !'O.L T. en 
matiere d'application de Conventions et de liberte syndicate, 1981 ANN. FR. DR. INT. 477, 486 
(Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique). 
29. See text at note l4supra. 
30. It is Eric Stein who has coauthored the leading text on the integration of Europe. See 
E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
31. The European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. The 
following quotation suggests the intention of the framers: 
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guarantee human rights within each state. Such international enforcement 
would be in everyone's interest, for it might help prevent the rise of another 
Hitler. The various protocols and optional clauses of this Convention have 
gained increasing adherence, and the associated Commission (more so than 
the Court) has become an important administrative mechanism of law re-
form within Europe. 
Another major emphasis was functionalism - the idea that economic 
union ( or plausibly other forms of technical cooperation) would ultimately 
lead to more complete political integration.32 This approach, though pur-
sued in the strongest and most powerful of the European political organiza-
tions - the European Economic Community - has proved somewhat 
disappointing as a mechanism of full integration. Europe has gone very far 
toward economic union but has had difficulty in expanding that union into 
political cooperation. Even so, in only twenty-six years, the Community 
has already helped transcend the enmity between France and Germany that 
had brought the continent to war three times in a century. 
In its legal evolution, the Community has followed the American pat-
tern, but with more complexity.33 Detailed legal balances are spelled out in 
the treaties and are generally followed, although one extremely important 
weighted voting provision did fail to survive a 1965 attack by Charles de 
Gaulle.34 The Community's constitutional jurisprudence already includes 
analogues of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee35 and of Missouri v. Holland,36 and 
it reflects the organic evolution of the Community in new and original 
ways. For example, in 1974 the German Constitutional Court concluded 
that Community actions would have to be tested against German human 
rights provisions until the Community gained its own mechanisms to pro-
tect those rights. 37 The decision was highly criticized as infringing the 
supremacy of Community law, but it evoked a response from the European 
Comm.unity's Court incorporating human rights norms into Community 
Mr. President, while I was in the Gestapo prisons ... my father, who was also a 
member of our French Parliament, was interned at Buchenwald. He told me that on the 
monumental gate of the camp was this outrageous inscription: "Just or unjust, the Fa-
therland." 
I think that from our first Session we can unanimously proclaim that in Europe there 
will henceforth only be just fatherlands. 
I think we can now unanimously confront "reasons of State" with the only sovereignty 
worth dying for, worthy in all circumstances of being defended, respected and safe-
guarded - the sovereignty of justice and of law. 
Speech by Pierre Henri Teitgen to the First Session of the Consultative Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe at Strasbourg (Aug. 19, 1949), reprinted in l COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 
"TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 30 (1961). 
32. See Mitrany, 17ze Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional, 4 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 119 (1965). 
33. See Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and tlte Making of a Transnational Constitution, 15 AM. J. 
INTL. L. l (1981). 
34. See J. NEWHOUSE, COLLISION IN BRUSSELS (1967); Lambert, Tlte Constitutional Crisis 
1965-66, 4 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 195 (1966). 
35. 14 U.S. (l Wheat.) 304 (1816). See Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL) 
(Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary Ruling). 
36. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See Advisory Opinion 1/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871. 
37. Judgment of May 29, 1974, BVerfG, W. Ger., 37 BVerfG 271 (English version re• 
printed in 14 Common Mkt. L. Reps. 540 (1974)). 
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law38 and a joint statement by the major Community political institutions 
that they would respect human rights in their future actions - a sort of 
Magna Carta.39 It is a constitution that is being interpreted. 
The Community's most recent constitutional innovation is to choose its 
Parliament by direct election. Although the Parliament has almost no for-
mal power, it is likely to help indirectly in transferring authority to the 
Community level. The elections, for example, may help educate the Euro-
pean citizen and interest him or her in bringing grievances to Community 
institutions. Parliamentary consultation and a question time in the House 
of Commons tradition - roles retained from the period when the Parlia-
ment was chosen indirectly by national legislatures - should give increased 
legitimacy to Community action and ensure that views are put forward 
without censorship by governments. Moreover, as a directly elected body, 
the Parliament may gain the moral and political authority needed to ensure 
serious consideration of its proposals for deeper Community integration.40 
III. THE Two CONCEPTS IN TENSION 
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute 
new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing 
its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness.41 
[I]s it possible for the Secretary-General to resolve controversial ques-
tions on a truly international basis without obtaining the formal decision of 
the organs? In my opinion and on the basis of my experience, the answer 
is in the affirmative . . . .42 
A. Building Community 
For Americans, perhaps in contrast to Europeans, the contractual ap-
proach to international organization is the one that automatically comes to 
mind. The idea of a written agreement among nations reflects both our 
predilection to legalism and the way our own federation was formed. 
Moreover, under this view, the task of creating international organiza-
tion becomes a relatively straightforward one of lobbying national govern-
ments. The politics rests on a direct idealistic appeal to governments that 
international organization would actually serve their long-term interests 
and that the short-term costs are likely to be outweighed by the long-term 
benefits to all societies. This is reflected in the common contemporary 
thel;Ile that an apocalyptic near-miss of nuclear war might shock national 
leaders into a new and critical disarmament negotiation. And the same 
38. See Roland Rutili v. Minister for the Interior (Case No. 36/75), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1219 (Preliminary Ruling). 
39. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 20 
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (Apr. 27, 1977). 
40. M. PALMER, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1981). 
41. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
42. Dag HammarskjOld, Lecture to Congregation at Oxford University (May 30, 1961), 
reprinted in SERVANT OF PEACE 329, 346 (W. Foote ed. 1962). 
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logic of perceived mutual benefit to nation-states underlies most proposals 
for solution of the variety of apparently technical international problems 
such as pollution, the law of the sea, the exploitation of outer space, or the 
control of multinational corporations. 
The reality of both the American and European integration efforts, 
however, is that community is more important than contract. Without a 
sense of community - based on cultural and economic and political inter-
action - nations will not seriously consider international organization, 
even for security purposes. Nor will the courts or executives or politicians 
work to strengthen integration rather than disintegration. Without commu-
nity, international organization will collapse as did the Articles of Confed-
eration and the League of Nations. Efforts to build community must 
therefore parallel those to build contractual integration. 
B. The Translegal Act 
The construction of organic unity, however, often contradicts the de-
mands of contractual unity. National governments, inherently unwilling to 
give up power, carefully restrict contractual integration. Hence, nearly 
every actual example of integration has involved acts of questionable for-
mal legality. This is obvious when international organization is constructed 
by conquest. But it is true elsewhere as well. Consider how the framers of 
the United States Constitution exceeded their instructions and produced an 
entirely new structure. Later, Lincoln's maintenance of the Union and his 
Emancipation Proclamation rested on questionable constitutional grounds, 
but they reflected the community's demands of unity and justice. 
The point is not unique to international organization. The extra-legal 
act has always played a role in the creation of a national government. Most 
governments owe their creation to a formally illegal act: revolution, seces-
sion, or constitutional change outside the rules of an established order. It is 
through such acts that a community transcends the limitations of prior con-
tractual legality. The possibility that international institutions could evolve 
similarly is one that has only rarely been raised, for it is hard to envision the 
revolution that produces international unity. Action for unity tends to take 
a less dramatic form such as the carefully thought out extension of a legiti-
mate authority. 
Evaluation of such extra-legal approaches requires immense caution, 
for legal restrictions are often designed precisely to guarantee justice. In 
upholding the union, Lincoln must have been tom between scrupulous ad-
herence to the institutions of freedom, representing carefully negotiated 
balances between state and federal power, and fear that those institutions 
would not survive if he did not stretch his authority. The Emancipation 
Proclamation poses similar problems43 as does any form of international 
intervention on behalf of human rights. Such intervention is appealing, 
and sometimes justified. But the nonintervention doctrine evolved in the 
nineteenth century precisely as a way to protect democratic nations against 
those who regarded democracy as subversive.44 
43. See J. FRANK, supra note 23, at 144-47. 
44. See R. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 64-141 (1974). 
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C. The Role of Democracy 
The definition of ethical criteria to judge extra-legal action is enor-
mously difficult and controversial. Most efforts have focused on such issues 
as civil disobedience, revolution, or war, and are rarely helpful in making 
the choices needed for the construction of an international order. 
Yet, the notion of democracy can itself provide an important criterion. 
If one is to build international community - the only basis on which trans-
legality can ever be justified - then the demands of the community itsel( 
provide a test. Interventions or extra-constitutional acts cannot be justified 
if they do not contribute to the democracy and freedom of that community. 
It is significant that there were ultimate legal checks upon President Lincoln 
and that the founders did submit their system to the states for approval. 
Democracy provides more than an ethical test for organic integration; it 
also provides the central mechanism. Today's leading example of actual 
organic integration, that of Europe, is taking place in a democratic region 
and is relying upon democratic institutions and transnational political par-
ties to achieve its unity. Without courts sometimes reaching to protect 
human rights or transnational political parties forced into accommodation, 
the European movement would have had no chance. It is only among de-
mocracies that people can hope to succeed with political movements to take 
power peacefully from current governments and give it to new entities. 
And it is among democracies that ideas, people, and political movements 
can most readily flow to create a new, broader sense of community.45 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, if we take political theory and the lessons of history seri-
ously, the task of building international organization is far less one of 
achieving agreements among governments than one of building the sense of 
international community that makes organic evolution possible and wise. 
This community must be ultimately a community of democracies; we would 
not want it otherwise, nor can it be otherwise. 
We cannot for a long time expect to bring the Soviet Union into a real 
international system, nor to convert the United Nations to a more effective 
role. But we can work now to make these actions possible in the future. 
Wherever we can, with both democratic and authoritarian nations, we 
should work for the flow of ideas and people that makes future community 
possible. And with the democracies of the world, including those in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America as well as those in Europe and the North Atlan-
tic, we should work for mechanisms of political cooperation, such as di-
rectly elected assemblies and regular working contacts among political 
parties, in addition to the human rights and economic institutions needed to 
deepen our legal and organic community. Such a community can grow and 
45. Note that this is not an argument that democracies are more peaceful than other gov-
ernments, an argument that may or may not be factually accurate. See K. WALTZ, supra note 
13, at 80-123. My argument is rather that democracy is a prerequisite to international organi-
zation, which, I have argued elsewhere, is, in the nuclear era, a prerequisite to peace. See 
Barton, The Proscription of Nuclear Weapons: A Third Nuclear Regime, in NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS AND WORLD POLITICS 149 (1977). 
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reform itself into one that provides security, that attracts the Soviet Union, 
and that ultimately incorporates the United Nations. 
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind. . . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat 
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the 
regimen of their [sic] barbarous ancestors. It is this preposterous idea 
which has lately deluged Europe in blood.46 
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42-43 (P. Ford ed. 1899). 
